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DO CRIMINAL OFFENDERS HAVE A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
REHABILITATION?*
Edgardo Rotman**
I.

THE RIGHTS MODEL OF REHABILITATION

Although the concept of rehabilitation' has profoundly shaped
American sentencing and correctional policies, a constitutional right
to rehabilitation remains unrecognized by the United States federal
courts. In sharp contrast, a number of European nations include
rehabilitation as a constitutional mandate. 2 Further, customary international law establishes a duty of rehabilitation as expressed, for
example, in the 1955 United Nations Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the American Convention of Human Rights.3
The extraordinary diffusion in the United States of indetermi* A modified version of this paper was presented

at the First International

Conference on Reaffirming Rehabilitation organized by The National Center on
Institutions and Alternatives (June 1986). I am grateful to professors Philip Heymann,
John Pottenger and Viviana Zelizer, as well as to attorney Elaine McGrath, for their
useful comments. NancyJackson made valuable editorial suggestions. Research for this
paper was sponsored by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Max Planck
Institute for Criminal Law and the Harvard Law School.
** Visiting Researcher, Harvard Law School. Advanced Degree in Criminology
(1975); Ph.D. (1973); Law Degree (1959), National University of Buenos Aires.
1 To avoid a complex terminological discussion, the word "rehabilitation," widely
accepted in the Anglo-American literature, will be used as a synonym of reform, reentry,
re-education, re-socialization, habilitation or socialization. It will also be used as the
equivalent of reintegration, which is generally limited to the after-release and community-based efforts of readaptation into society.
2 See COSTrrUZIONE [CosT.] art. 27 (Italy); CONSTTcI6N [CONST.] art. 25, 1 (Spain).
See also Judgment of June 5, 1973, Bundesverfassungsgericht
(W. Ger.), 35
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 202. For an analysis of the Argentine Constitu-

tion, see E.

ZAFFARONI,

1 TRATADO

DE DERECHO PENAL

63-65 (1983); Rotman, Dognmdtica

y Politica Criminalen la Interpretacidndel Articulo 51 del Cddigo Penal,REvisTA LA LEY (Buenos
Aires) (1981); Rotman, Resozialisierungstendenzen im argentinischen Strafgesetzuch, 91 ZsTW
475-98 (1979).
3 See infra section X, "Customary International Law." On the influence of the new
social defense movement on the genesis of this law, see M. ANCEL, LA D9FENSE SOCIALE
NOUVELLE 98-106 & 259 (1981); Rotman, La Politique du Traitement a la Lumire de la
Troisieme Edition de la Defense Sociale Nouvelle, REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROrr
P9NAL COMPAR9 573 n.3 (1983).
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nate sentencing4 and its associated parole system was the corollary
of the wholesale acceptance of what Francis Allen called the rehabilitative ideal. 5 Yet, in this particular sentencing context, rehabilitation is often seen by critics as working against individual rights. In
fact, a pretense of rehabilitation has often been used to protract incarceration unduly or to mask overly intrusive treatment methods,
such as the administration of constitutionally-inadmissible drug
therapies. 6 Although excessive penalties are not inherent in indeterminate sentencing and parole was originally conceived as a
means of shortening the period of incarceration, 7 a misuse of the
rehabilitative .concept helped to produce the opposite result. Likewise, it was a travesty of rehabilitation that allowed the development
of various intrusive behavior modification techniques to obtain compliance from particularly unruly inmates.8
The association of rehabilitation with policies opposed to individual freedoms is also evident in a series of judicial decisions that
invoked a rehabilitative aim to justify the abridgement of the in4 In a broad sense, indeterminate sentencing refers to any sentence of confinement
in which the actual term to be served is not known at the time of the judgment but will
be subject, within a considerable range, to the later decision of a parole board or other
sentencing authority. See Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 29
(1972).
5 F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981).
6 See N. KrrriE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 340-71 (197 1);J. MrrFORD, KIND AND
USUAL PUNISHMENT 127-30 (1973).
7 Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 297, 303 (1974).
8 In Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973), the court held that a program
of aversive conditioning in the form of nauseating injections for minor infractions was
cruel and unusual punishment. In Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973),
aversive therapy consisting of the administration of a "breath-stopping" drug was said
to raise serious constitutional questions respecting cruel and unusual punishment or
impermissible tinkering with the mental processes. Privacy was protected in Kaimowitz
v. Dep't of Mental Health of Michigan, No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct.
1973), which held unconstitutional psychosurgery on involuntarily detained persons. A
major behavior modification program was the Special Treatment and Rehabilitation
Training Program (START) established by the United States Bureau of Prisons at the
federal hospital in Springfield, Missouri. START aimed to produce institutional adjustment of maladaptive prisoners from other federal prisons. Based on positive reinforcement, it excluded intrusive methods such as drugs, psychosurgery and aversive
conditioning. The program was nevertheless discontinued because it included punitive
procedures without the corresponding due process safeguards. See Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974). Another example, the therapeutic milieu established in the federal penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, was discontinued because of its
coercive aspects and as the result of the inmates' resistance. See M. NIETZEL, CRIME AND
ITS MODIFICATION 127-29 (1979); V. WILLIAMS, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN PENOLOGY 6365 (1979); Carlson, Behavior Modification in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1 NEw ENG. J.
PRISON L. 155, 164-65 (1974); Rothman, Behavior Modification in Total Institutions, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17-24 (1974).
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mates' basic rights. At the same time, a diametrically opposed view
of rehabilitation has been used in prisoners' rights litigation to bolster the very rights curtailed by a repressive use of the concept. In
several cases, for instance, the two competing meanings of rehabilitation sustained divergent opinions within the same United States
Supreme Court decision. In Wolff v. McDonnell,9 the majority opinion held that the application of due process safeguards, such as permitting confrontation and cross-examination, to the deprivation of
"good time," would hinder rehabilitative goals. Conversely, the
dissenting opinion concluded that greater procedural fairness enhances rehabilitation. In Procunier v. Martinez,10 the majority justified a regulation authorizing prisoner mail censorship on the basis
of the governmental interest in rehabilitation. Justice Marshall saw
the regulation as thwarting a rehabilitative function-namely diminishing the crippling and "artificial increase of alienation"-by restricting communication with the outside world. On the one hand,
the idea of rehabilitation is used to justify disciplinary goals and paternalistic state intervention, while on the other, it serves to advance
basic prisoners' rights, such as due process and free speech in the
mentioned cases, as well as health or religion in other decisions."
This confusing ambivalence of the rehabilitative concept must be
clarified before analyzing the plausibility of a right to rehabilitation
in the United States.
Two contradicting models of rehabilitation-one authoritarian
and paternalistic in nature and the other humanistic and liberty-cen9 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562 (1974)(Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The majority opinion considered that if disciplinary proceedings
were to comply with constitutional requirements, it "would... make more difficult the
utilization of the disciplinary process as a tool to advance the rehabilitative goals of the
institution." Id. at 563. This reasoning expresses a coercive concept of rehabilitation
opposed by Justice Marshall's opinion. Quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,484
(1972), he underlined the negative effect on rehabilitation of the feelings of powerlessness and frustration resulting from arbitrariness. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 589 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). A basic hurdle to rehabilitation is "the concept of a prisoner as a nonperson and the jailer as an absolute monarch." Id. at 597
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
10 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
11
In Nicholson v. Choctaw County, Alabama, 498 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Ala. 1980),
rehabilitation was considered to reinforce the first amendment's arguments supporting
the free exercise of religion. In Barnett v. Rogers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
religion was considered as subserving the rehabilitative function by providing an area
within which the inmate may reclaim his dignity and reassert his individuality. The right
to health, protected in various decisions based on the totality of prison conditions, was
specifically related to rehabilitation in Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir.
1977), and in Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981), where a healthy habilitative environment was declared constitutionally
mandated.
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teredl 2-underlie the contradictory statements of the Supreme
Court regarding the functions and significance of the rehabilitative
goal. The first model is in fact a subtle version of the outdated repressive model of corrections. In this view correctional treatment is
essentially a technical device to mold the personality of offenders
and obtain their compliance with a predesigned pattern of thought
and behavior. Such "rehabilitation" is easily downgraded to a mere
instrument of institutional discipline and tends to resort to brainwashing methods incompatible with the individual's right to privacy.
The second model, which stems from an anthropocentric outlook, places no faith in individual transformation through subtly imposed paradigms. It assumes instead that significant change can
result only from the individual's own insight and uses dialogue to
encourage the process of self-discovery. This model does not rely
on idealistic preaching to reintegrate offenders to a hostile society.
Instead, humanistic rehabilitation offers inmates a sound and trustworthy opportunity to remake their lives. Thus, this model seeks to
awaken in inmates a deep awareness of their relationships with the
rest of society, resulting in a genuine sense of social responsibility.
The humanistic model of rehabilitation affirms the concept of
prison inmates as possessors of rights. This legal status generates
feelings of self-worth and trust in the legal system and favors the
possibility of self-command and responsible action within society.
This conception ultimately leads rehabilitative efforts toward the
paradigm of the inmate as a full-fledged citizen.' 3 The prisoners'
legal status reinforces their eventual participation in the shaping
and governing of society. Thus, prisoners' rights can be qualified,
using Ely's terminology, as representation-reinforcing. 14 This continuum of rights culminates in the right to rehabilitation, which can
12 Rotman, Latest Trends in Crime Policy and Their Effect on Sentencing, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM OF THE INTERNATIONAL PENAL AND PENITENTIARY

FOUNDATION 76 (1982). On the humanistic model of rehabilitation, see also Rotman,
L'Evolution de la PensieJuridiquesur le But de la Sanction Phnale, in 2 ASPECTS NOUVEAUX DE
LA PENSfE JURIDIQUE 163-76 (M61anges Ancel ed. 1975); Rotman, Le Sense de
l'IndividualisationJudiciaire,2 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PNAL COMPARt
437-44 (1977).
13 Conrad, Reintegration: Practice in Search of Theory, in REINTEGRATION OF THE OFFENDER INTO THE COMMUNrrY 21 (1973).

14 Ely, Toward a Representation-ReinforcingMode ofJudicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451
(1978). In Ely's constitutional interpretation, the commitment to representative democracy, as opposed to a majoritarian republicanism, includes recognition of an exceptional
class of positive rights. According to Michelman, Welfare Rights in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 WASH. U.LQ. 659, 669-85, these include rights to the indispensable means of
effective participation in the institutional system itself. Basic education, for example,
does not amount to participation in the sense that acts of voting do, but it is a prerequisite to achieving the guaranteed democratic representation.
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be formulated as the right to an opportunity to return to society
with an improved chance of being a useful citizen and of staying out
of prison. This right requires not only education and therapy, but
also a non-destructive prison environment and, when possible, lessrestrictive alternatives to incarceration. The right to rehabilitation
is consistent with the drive towards the full restoration of the civil
and political rights of citizenship after release. 15
The inclusion of rehabilitation in the sphere of individual rights
does not necessarily exclude it as a goal of state penal policies. Such
a right, however, requires a penal policy that maintains scrupulous
respect for the dignity of prisoners and provides for the genuine
fulfillment of their basic human needs, which go beyond mere physical survival. But even in the absence of such initiative from the
state, a right to rehabilitation makes the performance of rehabilitative services legally enforceable, allowing the courts to intervene in
the case of administrative reluctance.' 6 According to Dworkin's distinction between rights and social goals, 17 the description of rehabilitation as a right implies granting the rehabilitative claim a "certain
threshold weight against collective goals in general." This transforms such a right into a "political trump," creating an area of exception against state punitive policies. It therefore replaces purely
vindictive justice with a constructive approach of social reintegration.
The denial of rehabilitation and the consequent lack of concern
for the future life of the offender amounts to a passive and indifferent acceptance of the inevitable deterioration brought about by life
in the institution. Imprisonment itselfjeopardizes other rights different from those forfeited through the commission of a crime and
the consequent criminal punishment. Moreover, a large majority of
inmates are socially handicapped offenders who need basic support
in the areas of education, job-training and fundamental social learning. Their social handicap is considerably aggravated by the stigma
SeeJ. JACOBS, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 23-30 (1983).
F. CULLEN & K. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION 263 (1982). Cullen and
Gilbert have proposed a state obligation to rehabilitate through administrative accountability and parole contracts. They also advocate the exercise of political and moral pressure. The fact that judicial intervention has vastly improved the quality of prison life, see
Comment, Confronting the Conditionsof Confinement: An ExpandedRole for the Courts in Prison
Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367, 389 (1977), does not preclude other forms of
action to further humanistic rehabilitative policies. "Though courts and litigation will
always remain vital [to the rights movement]," David J. Rothman "proposes to devote
new attention to legislative and administrative concerns." Rothman, Afterword, in DOING
GOOD 184 (1981).
17 R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 92 (1980).
15

16
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of a criminal record, requiring additional efforts from social agencies to support the arduous process of social reintegration.
Those basic human needs create the moral basis to institute a
legal duty of the state to counteract the effects of disabling criminal
punishment, particularly when applied to offenders with a flawed socialization process, and to establish a correlative right of the criminal offender to rehabilitation. This right demands from the state an
affirmative care and a positive contribution to the welfare of the inmates, counteracting the harms of imprisonment. Rehabilitation in
this sense means a state effort to prevent and neutralize the unwanted harmful side effects of its own punitive intervention 1 8 as well
as to respond to the human challenge posed by the extremely socially-deprived offender.
II.

OBSTACLES TO A RIGHT OF REHABILITATION:
LESS ELIGIBILITY AND THE "WAR THEORY"

THE PRINCIPLE OF
OF CRIME

Earlier in the history of imprisonment, unnecessary pains and
deprivations were deliberately added to incarceration. Such afflictive purpose permeated the various forms of "carcere duro" and
"durissimo," the irons and chains, hard labor, and the publicly humiliating forms of penal servitude. The concern for specific deterrence-that is, the desire to make the experience of punishment
dreadful-was even more important than the economic interest in
exploiting the convict's labor. The underlying assumption that
prison itself was insufficient punishment was mirrored in the forms
of unproductive and punitive work represented by the tread mill,
the crank and the shot-drill.' 9
The limitation of imprisonment to mere loss of liberty is a hallmark of modern civilized punishment. This stage is not reached
simply by banning those primitive forms of additional punishment.
To avoid the harmful effects of incarceration on the mental and so18 Besides the general depersonalizing impact of dosed institutions described in E.
GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SrruATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER
INMATES 1-124 (1961), some specific side-effects of imprisonment demanding a counter-

acting action are the following: increased tendency to recidivism due to the creation of
criminogenic inmates' social systems; victimization resulting from assaults or harassment by prisoners; various physical and psychological effects of prison stress; "gross
deterioration and permanent scarring of ... mental, emotional and behavioral integ-

rity." See DeWolfe & DeWolfe, Impact of Prison Conditions on the Mental Health of Inmates,
1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 479, 507. See also R. JOHNSON & H. TOCH, THE PAINS OF IMPRISON-

MENT (1982). These effects are exacerbated with the current overcrowding of prisons.
See Gaes, The Effects of Overcrowding in Prison, 6 CRIME & JUSTICE 95-146 (1985); Our
Crowded Prisons,478 THE ANNALS AAPSS (Nat'l Inst. of Corrections ed. 1985); EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUNDATION, OVERCROWDED TIME (1982).

19 G. IVES, A HISTORY OF PENAL METHODS 188-94 (1970).

19861

RIGHT TO REHABILITATION?

1029

cial health of the inmate, some positive action towards rehabilitation
is essential.
Such action, which includes improvements in prison conditions
and in the economic opportunities of prisoners, encounters a serious obstacle in the principle of "less eligibility." Formulated by
Bentham in 1791, this principle holds that "saving the regard due to
life, health and bodily ease, the ordinary conditions of a convict
doomed to punishment" shall not be made "more eligible than that
20
of the poorest class of citizens in a state of innocence and liberty."
Bentham's consideration of life, health and bodily ease mitigates the
extreme consequences of the principle of less eligibility. To apply
the principle strictly would mean maintaining prison conditions less
favorable than those found in the worst slums or, in extreme situations, to push prisoners to the limits of starvation.
In modern democratic societies, where freedom is the highest
value, neither catastrophic social or economic conditions could
make imprisonment attractive, however humane or civilized it might
be, nor neutralize its intrinsic deterrent potential. Though a few
derelicts may commit minor offenses to obtain jail shelter during the
winter, it is highly unlikely that the rehabilitative prospectives of a
correctional institution would diminish the deterrent effect of a
long-term stay or motivate anyone to commit a felony. Even in
times of crisis, the general population will derive the stimulus for
life from a margin of personal freedom, which is denied to prisoners. To prevent their wholesale deterioration while institutional21
ized, inmates must be offered a substitute for freedom.
Conversely, under dictatorships, where the population at large
has already been considerably deprived of its freedom, there is a
22
tendency to make the prisoner "feel his position by other means."
It is therefore not surprising that during the Eleventh International
Penal and Penitentiary Congress, which met in Berlin in 1935, the
delegation of a totalitarian Germany strongly adhered to the principle of less eligibility, demanding that the "prisoner's standard of life
should not be superior to that of the poorest citizen."' 23 In contrast,
the English and Norwegian delegations stressed the abysmal differences between the lives of the free population and of those suffering
the depressing effects of imprisonment, which made it "essential
20 j. BENTHAM, PANOPTICON OR THE INSPECTION HOUSE: POSTCRIPT (part II)
21 H. MANNHEIM, THE DILEMMA OF PENAL REFORM
22

(1791).

70 (1939).

Id. at 71.

23 PROCEEDINGS OF THE

(1937).

XITH INTERNATIONAL

PENAL AND PENITENTIARY CONGRESS

135
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that a counterpoise should be found."' 24 The English report emphasized that the privation of liberty itself is the greatest of evils, to
which Mannheim added, on the basis of expert opinion, that the
length of imprisonment is more dreaded than its harshness. 25
There is, of course, a common-sense relationship between a country's economy and its prison standards, but that does not condone
an "artifically contrived" principle of less eligibility or, as Mannheim
26
calls it, of "non superiority."
The "intellectually and morally bankrupt" 2 7 principle of less eligibility still appeals to many and is connected with the resurgence
of law and order policies. Correctional officers use it both as a
moral justification for their contemptuous attitude towards inmates
and as a strategy to control them. The concept also appeals to the
popular imagination, especially when the mass media and politicians
arouse feelings of fear and insecurity through exaggerated reports
of the upsurge of violent crime. In the correctional field, as Sherman and Hawkins point out, "[t]he dangers and inequities of a policy that follows too closely the shifts in vox populi are obvious
28
enough to scare us all."
Rising crime rates and a one-sided concern for the victims of
crime have often been invoked in an attempt to revamp past repressive models. A "war theory" of crime has been developed, whose
ethic "conceives of the offender as an alien and in doing so induces
a regression to primitive conceptions of penal justice." 29 In
America, such attitudes influenced the unsuccessful penal policies of
the last decade. Tough determinate sentencing provoked the rise of
prison populations to the extreme of "severe overcrowding, diminished services and heightened potential for violence." 3 0
Law and order policies since the mid-1960s have demanded security for the citizen at home, at the workplace and in the streets, an
obviously legitimate objective. Such policies were flawed, however,
in that they assumed that the failure of the criminal justice system
was due to the expansion of rights and procedural safeguards for
accused criminals. In fact, many social, demographic and economic
factors contributed to the upturn in crime rates.31 Another defect of
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

MANNHEIM, supra note 21, at 68.
H. MANNHEIM, supra note 21, at 71.
H. MANNHEIM, supra note 21, at 70.

H.

A. RUTHERFORD, PRISONS AND THE PROCESS OF JUSTICE 94 (1984).
M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 18 (1981).
F. ALLEN, supra note 5, at 38.
F. CULLEN & K. GILBERT, supra note 16, at 151; E. CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME

33
(1985).
31 On the impasse created by the failure of repressive policies combined with opposi-
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these policies was the "legal superstition" 3 2 that a harsh execution
of prison sentences would prevent the inmate from relapsing into
crime. Yet the belief in education through rigor and severity has
long been abandoned in the fields of animal training and child rearing.3 3 Besides, there is no evidence that milder forms of imprisonment increase criminality.3 4 In fact, it was precisely the
ineffectiveness of the severe classical forms of imprisonment that inspired late nineteenth century reform efforts to mitigate their harshness. While harsh punishment had not been able to prevent an
alarming increase of recidivism, the general belief in its effectiveness barred all true rehabilitative possibilities.
The law and order movement tends to ignore the lessons of the
past. Even in the eighteenth century, Blackstone and Montesquieu
indicated that the certainty of punishment is more important to deterrence than its severity. Likewise, Beccaria's famous essay demonstrated the overriding importance of the promptness, certainty and
inexorability of punishment, and its proportion to the crime committed. 35 His utilitarian arguments were so convincing that they
rendered obsolete most of the earlier scholarly science based on a
belief in exemplary cruel punishment. Today's champions of increased punishment have far too easily brushed aside the insights of
the Enlightment.
III.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLE "NULLUM

CRIMEN, NULLA POENA, SINE LEGE"

AND

THE RIGHT TO

REHABILITATION

To oppose a right to rehabilitation is to ignore the due process
limitation to criminal sanctions embodied in the principle "nullum
crimen, nulla poena, sine lege," inherited in substance from the Magna
Carta,3 6 first expressed in positive law in the post-Enlightment codification and applied today with few exceptions in all major legal systems of the world. This principle implies not only that conduct
tion to a liberal crime policy that had never really been tried, see Rotman, Latest Trends in

Crime Polity, supra note 12, at 75; E.
G. ARzT,
33 Id. at 65.
34 Id.
32

CURRIE,

supra note 30, at 12-20.

DER RUF NACH RECHT UND ORDNUNG

64 (1976).

35 C. BECCARIA-BONEsANA, AN ESSAY ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENTS

28-32, 47, 74-77 &

93-96 (rev. ed. 1953)(2d Am. ed. 1819).
36 The Magna Carta's provision had only a procedural significance, although accomplishing the same function. The formulation of the Latin rule with its full modem meaning is due to Anselm Feuerbach in the first edition of his Textbook on Criminal Law
(1801). On the origins of the principle, see V. KREY, KEINE STRAFE OHNE GESETz 37-47
(1983); E. ZAFFARONI, supra note 2, at 139. See H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION
(1983)(finding its origins in twelfth century eclessiastical law).
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cannot be considered criminal unless defined as such by the law
before the conduct occurs but also that no punishment beyond what
was prescribed by the pre-existent law can be imposed. Although
not expressly stated in the Constitution, this principle is embodied
in the prohibition of ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder and in
the fifth and fourteenth amendments.3 7 "Just as there must be a
declaration of the law's intention to make an act a crime, so its punishment must be promulgated through the same process." 38 The
legislative duty to provide fair warning of punishable conduct extends, as an element of due process, to the nature and severity of
the prescribed punishment. Due process of law is also violated
when imprisonment includes punitive ingredients not specified by
statute. This interpretation coincides with the principle established
by a United States District Court in Florida that "the courts have the
duty to protect prisoners from unlawful and onerous treatment of a
nature that, of itself, adds punitive measures to those legally meted
' 39
out by the court."
According to the "nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege" principle,
the only valid purpose of imprisonment is to punish according to
the law, however tautological this statement may appear. The notion of legal punishment considerably limits the possibility of adding punitive elements, whatever their motivation, to incarceration.
The deterrent function of criminal law must flow from the normative threat of punishment and may not be left to the discretion of
administrative authority. When the legislators wanted to make imprisonment a particularly excruciating experience, they clearly expressed that intention through laws embodying the now largely
abolished forms of hard labor or penal servitude. In this regard, the
Select Committee of the House of Lords defined in 1863 the plight
of the convicted as "hard labour, hard fare, and hard bed." In opposition to this idea of increasing punishment by adding extra suffering to imprisonment, later scholars proclaimed that "offenders
are sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment." 40 This policy is mirrored in the international movement for the unification of
prison sentences, which sought to abolish publicly humiliating and
37 See Bassiouni, The Sources and Limits of CriminalLaw in the United States, 3 & 4 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr PENAL

301, 350 (1975).

38 Id. at 351.

39 Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 864 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part and modified in
part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Barnes v. Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218
(D.V.I. 1976).
40 Ancel, L 'abolitionde la peine de mort et le problekn de la peine de remplacement, in Studies
in Penology Dedicated to the Memory of Sir Lionel Fox 9 (M. Lopez-Rey & C. Germain
eds. 1964)(quoting Alexander Paterson) (footnote omitted).
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afflictive forms of imprisonment and to reduce imprisonment solely
to loss of liberty. The question was first introduced during the International Penitentiary Congress of London and further debated in
the next Congress which met at Stockholm in 1878. 4 1 In Barnes v.
Virgin Islands,4 2 the district court reflected the viewpoint of enlightened modem penology when it wrote that "a convicted person is
not sent to a penal institution to receive additional punishment...
'43
the fact of incarceration is the punishment.
The "nulla poena, nullum crimen, sine lege" principle has been invoked against an abusive notion of rehabilitation, which led to excessively discretionary sentencing practices. 4 4 Today this same
principle can be used as a legal pillar to support a constitutional
right to rehabilitation. If imprisonment itself is the punishment, the
unchecked harmful effects of incarceration on the mental and social
health of the inmate represent illegal additional punishment. Institutionalization in an alienating and depersonalizing environment,
without opportunities to combat degeneration or foster positive
human development, is a source of various harmful effects that play
no part in the design of legal sanctions. The law threatens citizens
with imprisonment as the consequence of criminal conduct; that is
where the deterrent function of the legal norm should stop. The
law expects the citizen to foresee the loss of liberty prescribed by
statute but not the additional horrors of incarceration that are not
intended by law. The only way to prevent or compensate for such
unjustified deprivations is to carry out a positive program of rehabilitative action.
Rehabilitation does not oppose the measure of deterrence inherent in legal punishment. It strives only to maintain punishment
within its legal limits, counteracting its unwarranted consequences.
There is thus no basis for proposing deterrent policies as a novel
substitute for rehabilitation, for deterrence has always been the essence of criminal law. A right to rehabilitation does not contradict
the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions as long as they do not exceed the limits marked by the due process of law. Indeed, a basic
function of rehabilitation is to prevent and counteract such abuses.

IV. REHABILrrATION AND THE PURPOSE OF IMPRISONMENT
Traditionally, rehabilitation has been considered one of the
41 Bureau de la Commission Pnitentiaire Internationale, LE CONGRkS PNNITENTIAIRE
139-70 (1879).
42 415 F. Supp. 1218 (D.V.I. 1976).
43 Id. at 1224.
44 M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 3 (1973).
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purposes of imprisonment on the mistaken assumption that incarceration itself could be rehabilitative. This fallacy arose from a misapplication of the notion of monastic penance to the first
penitentiaries. Isolation, which together with labor and prayer were
basic ingredients of the monastic notion of penance, proved to have
disastrous consequences on the inmates of the nineteenth century
penitentiaries. However, the identification of imprisonment with rehabilitation survived this failure. This distortion contributed to the
crisis of rehabilitative policies in the 1970s. But rehabilitation is still
tied up with imprisonment in another sense: the harms of imprisonment demand a counteractive rehabilitative action. Accordingly,
modem rehabilitation has become either a force counteractive to
imprisonment or a constructive search for an alternative social reaction to crime. It attempts not only to transform the desocializing
prison environment but also to replace, as far as possible, institutional confinement with noncustodial alternatives.
Although rehabilitation is not the purpose of imprisonment, it
may well be a goal of corrections as a whole. In fact, rehabilitation
is the overriding goal of a humanistic correctional system that seeks
to minimize the harmful side-effects of state punitive intervention.
In such a system, rehabilitation not only satisfies the social interest
of enlightened crime prevention but also constitutes a right of the
offender as a human being. Although prisons themselves constitute
a major obstacle to rehabilitation, they also force any civilized society into rehabilitative undertakings. "Unless we return to a prison
system where we lock people up, throw away the key, and slide gruel
under the door, the prison will have to have a program. '4 5 A correctional system "without socialization offerings nor interest in
46
treatment means, in fact, de-humanization and regression."
Halleck and Witte deny that it is possible to create a benign
prison environment without trying to rehabilitate offenders. To endure the restrictions of prison life without bitterness and aggressiveness, they explain, the offender must have hope and a sense of
significance. 4 7 Correctional workers share this psychological need.
In this context, Irwin emphasizes that dismantling the rehabilitative
idea will hurt the morale of correctional officers by depriving them
of a justifying philosophy that gives their work purpose and dig105 (1976).
G. KAISER, Resozialisierungund Zeitgeist, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR THOMAS WURTENBERGER
371 (1977).
47 Halleck & Witte, Is Rehabilitation Dead?, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 372, 378 (1977).
45 R. CARLSON, THE DILEMMAS OF CORRECTIONS
46
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nity.48 In modern American mega-prisons, meaningful rehabilitative action to counteract the negative effects of imprisonment
should be accompanied by action at the social and cultural levels to
eradicate institutional violence, neutralize the action of organized
gangs, avoid the formation of prison subcultures and overcome racial conflict. 4 9 Rehabilitation also requires a sentencing policy that
relieves the present inhuman overcrowding of prisons.
V.

THE RIGHTS MODEL AND THE RELEVANCE
OF REHABILITATIVE EFFECTIVENESS

Recent criticisms of rehabilitative programs have focused on
their alleged ineffectivenes. The claim of ineffectiveness has not
only been used as an independent argument against rehabilitative
policies but has reinforced criticisms of a different nature. Those
responsible for rehabilitative policies responded hesitantly at first to
these charges, but new empirical findings have now changed the direction of the intellectual tide. More sophisticated research revealed serious weaknesses in the data and methodology used by the
detractors of rehabilitation, undercutting their conclusion that
"nothing works." 50 The result was a considerable improvement in
evaluative disciplines with significant effects on the quality of the
new rehabilitative programs.5 1 Although no longer seen as a universal panacea, rehabilitation has been proven effective under certain conditions for certain categories of offenders. Today
rehabilitation implies a differential strategy with various levels of
effectiveness.
The significance of rehabilitation, however, goes beyond this
48 Irwin, The ChangingSocial Structure of the Men's Prison, 8 CORRECTIONS & PUNISHMENT
21, 32 (1977).
49 On the possibilities and strategies of neutralizing prison violence, communitybased delinquency prevention programs, provision of new opportunity structures and
institutional and community change in general, see A. MILLER & L. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY
AND COMMUNITY (1985). On need to focus on new loci of intervention (e.g., the family,
the school, the workplace, the community), see NEw DIRECTIONS INTHE REHABILITATION
OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 135-73 (S.Martin, L. Sechrest & R. Redner eds. 1981); E. CURPIE, supra note 30, at 224-78. The need to direct socializing efforts not only to individuals but also to their social environment was recognized in The Revision of the Minimum
Program of the InternationalSociety of Social Defense, BULL. INT'L Soc'Y Soc. DEFENSE 26
(English-French ed. 1984). On coping with gangs at the institutional level, see Conrad,
Who's in Charge? The Control of Gang Violence in CaliforniaPrisons, in CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
PLANNING 135-47 (1979).
50 This conclusion was derived mainly from an erroneous interpretation of Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, 35 THE PUB. INTEREST 22
(1974).
51 See R. Ross & P. GENDREAU, EFFECTIVE CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (1980); Gendreau & Ross, Offender Rehabilitation: The Appeal of Success, FED. PROBATION 45 (1981).
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empirical dispute. Making support for rehabilitation contingent
upon its effectiveness has rendered it more vulnerable to empirical
absolutists and other opponents. If rehabilitation is recognized as a
right, its value no longer hinges exclusively on its effectiveness.
A theoretical inquiry into the relevance of rehabilitative effectiveness should consider rehabilitation from two perspectives: as a
right of the offender and as a governmental interest. The traditional
one-sided view of rehabilitation as a governmental instrument to attain social goals led to an overemphasis on the question of its effectiveness. This view was associated with an authoritarian notion of
rehabilitation in which society is the only acting force and individuals, lacking any initiative, are mere passive recipients of such action.
Like deterrence or incapacitation, rehabilitation was regarded as a
social policy dictated without consideration for the offenders personal life. The real difference between specific deterrence and rehabilitation lies in the means by which the ends are achieved.
Enhancing the human potentialities of the offender is a specific feature of rehabilitation, whereas the punitive approach relies on fear
or the aversion of pain.
The rights model, in contrast, views rehabilitation from the perspective of the offender without losing sight of the societal impact of
rehabilitation. Where rehabilitation is conceived as a right, effectiveness becomes a secondary consideration and no longer encroaches upon other priorities related to the needs of individual
offenders and to the requirements of their actual sociopsychological
improvement. According to the rights model, learning activities, dialogue, social interaction and psychotherapy are provided without
calculating their likelihood of ultimate success or guaranteeing their
effectiveness.
A right to rehabilitation, however, includes the right to minimum standards of seriousness and quality in the performed services.
In this respect, a certain degree of efficacy is inherent in any serious
rehabilitative undertaking. Such efforts should be likely to improve
on offenders' ability to live a crime-free life, enrich their skills, or
improve their psychological condition according to the state of the
art in psychotherapy. But the existence and force of the right is not
dependent on the cost-effectiveness of its exercise or on any particular outcome.
Viewed from the perspective of society, rehabilitation is part of
governmental planning and social policy. At this level, evaluation
plays an undeniably important role. It is a legitimate governmental
concern to report tangible results to taxpayers, but the real value of
accurate evaluation goes far beyond this rendering of accounts. Im-
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proved evaluation research will provide indispensable feedback to
ongoing or future rehabilitative efforts. This guiding function is essential for critical policy decisions. Empirical research on sanctions,
for example, may make it possible to adopt humane and less intrusive penal policies if they can be shown to be as effective as harsher
ones.
When rehabilitation is seen as a right of the offender, its independence from its outcome becomes evident. Obsessive questioning of rehabilitation's effectiveness is understandable if it is merely a
governmental interest. The rights perspective encourages a shift in
the focus of concern. The effectiveness of rehabilitation would still
be of interest, but would not be of overriding importance. Instead,
one will ask how much it matters and in what ways.
VI.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE RECOGNITION OF
A RIGrr TO REHABILITATION

In America, through a misapplication of the medical model of
corrections, rehabilitation has strengthened the power of the state
to act with oppressive paternalism, and it has increased the discretion of judicial and administrative sentencing authorities, and the
power of correctional agencies. Without denying a legitimate governmental interest in rehabilitation, the emergent conception of rehabilitation as a right of the offender affirms a positive position for
the individual in relation to the state. Rehabilitation is no longer
seen as a generous initiative, a benevolent concession of the state or
governmental policy dictated by considerations of social revenue.
Instead, the rights model views rehabilitation from the perspective
of the offender-as the culmination of a continuum of rights guaranteeing the dignity of human beings confronted with criminal
52
conviction.
The recognition of rehabilitation as a right of the prisoner not
only grants rehabilitative undertakings a specific due-process protection, but demands momentous changes in the sentencing and
correctional systems. For instance, it requires both new legal guidelines for the sentencing authorities or an improvement of the present ones to reduce overcrowding, which is incompatible with
rehabilitation,5 3 and a considerable expansion of community-based
alternatives to imprisonment. It is possible that neither sentencing
reforms nor community programs will totally alleviate overcrowd52 Rotman, La Protection des Droits de I'Homme en Matire Pinale dans le droit Argentin et
Latino-Ambricain, 47 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE Dnorr PNAL 83, 84 (1976).

53 See Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 811 (D. Or. 1980).
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ing. Even so, a right to rehabilitation will mean that new prisons
must meet stringent qualitative standards incompatible with a
purely incapacitation-oriented approach to construction. On the
whole, a strict implementation of the right to rehabilitation will reduce the present excessive reliance on imprisonment as a form of
punishment in the United States.
Some may fear that recognizing rehabilitation as a constitutional right will mean less surveillance of institutionalized offenders,
with harmful results. True, rehabilitation introduces into the prison
educational and treatment staff often unconcerned with the questions of custody, but the development of trust in incarcerated
human beings within a rehabilitation-oriented institution warrants a
relaxing of custodial standards. The liberty-centered notion of rehabilitation implied in the rights model is clearly detached from the
disciplinary goals of the institution. Rehabilitative efforts can thus
no longer be perverted through their use as manipulative devices.
This clear distinction between rehabilitation and discipline does not
deny the importance of order and security in correctional institutions. Further, discipline problems would most likely diminish in a
rehabilitation-centered institution where staff and inmates are devoted to a meaningful goal. Discipline is maintained even when the
development of trust between inmates and custodians leads to the
granting of different forms of furloughs and work release. Another
possible objection is that a right to rehabilitation may impose unreasonable budgetary pressures on taxpayers. Federal court rulings
have held that monetary considerations are insufficient to override
constitutional demands. 5 4 Moreover, the reduced cost of appointing correctional officers and nonprofessional staff in rehabilitation-oriented activities should be considered, 5 5 as well as the longterm potential gains derived from the reduction of recidivism.
While admitting the paramount importance of rehabilitation,
the Supreme Court has consistently abstained from holding it to be
included in the Bill of Rights. Even the most progressive federal
judges, responsible for far-reaching transformations in state penal
institutions, have hesitated to take this ultimate step which could result in drastic innovations in the criminal justice system and trans54 Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968); Barnes, 415 F. Supp. at 1227.

55 For an account of Ringe Prison in Denmark, see Rotthaus, Das ddnische Staatsgefdngnis in Ringe--ein Gegenmodellzur SozialtherapeutischenAnstalt?, in SOZIALTHERAPIE UND
BEHANDLUNGSFORSCHUNG 99 & 102 (1980). On the involvement of prison officers in
treatment activities, see Gray, The Therapeutic Community andEvaluation of Results, I INT'LJ.
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 330 (1973); Rotthaus, Schwierige und gefidhrliche Gefangene im
englischen Strafvollzug, in SOZIALTHERAPIE UND BEHANDLUNGSFORSCHUNG 105 (1980).
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form the nature of imprisonment in the United States. Although
hinting that the sociological theory of rehabilitation may eventually
"ripen in constitutional law," 56 the federal courts have denied the
existence of a constitutional right to rehabilitation, at least in a positive form. The courts have, however, already attributed an essential
role to rehabilitation in the overall prison environment. They have
in effect acknowledged the right to rehabilitation in a negative
form-the right to counteract the deteriorating effects of imprisonment. The courts have also granted the prisoner a limited right to
psychiatric treatment. These openings in the present body of law,
as well as the other avenues of interpretation that will be explored in
this article, should provide ample support for the right to rehabilita57
tion "when [the courts] decide to recognize it."
VII.

LACK OF REHABILITATION AS CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Although the federal courts have not explicitly recognized a
positive right to rehabilitation, they have assigned the rehabilitative
idea a significant role in the constitutional analysis of the conditions
of confinement. The eighth amendnient's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment is the linchpin of such promising interpretative developments. The notion of cruel and unusual punishment,
dating from the Magna Carta of 1215, was given a broader meaning
in the United States. It was not merely a prohibition of excessive
punishment, but also an exclusion of torture and of any particularly
cruel mode of inflicting punishment.
Until the late 1960s the "hands-off" 5 8 doctrine ruled out any
interference by the judiciary in prison administration. A prisoner,
who in 1871 was characterized by a court as "a slave of the State," 5 9
had scarcely any rights despite progressive reforms in other aspects
of criminal law and procedure. Even the increasing importance attributed by the courts to the rehabilitative aim, as in the landmark
decision Williams v. New York, 60 did not open the gates of the penitentiary to judicial scrutiny. To the contrary, penal institutions were
abandoned to the unchecked power of their adminstrators, who
56 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971). See alsoJ. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRISONERS 179 (1985).
57 Dwyer & Botein, The Right to Rehabilitationfor Prisoners-JudicialReform of the Correctional Process, 20 N.Y.L.F. 273, 274 (1974).
58 This expression was first used in FRITCH, CIVIL RIGHTS OF FEDERAL PRISON INMATES 31 (1961), quoted in, Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique ofJudicialRefusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE LJ. 506 (1963).
59 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
60 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
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were entitled to pursue whatever punitive or despotic methods they
chose to apply. The courts intervened in only a few extreme cases.
Violation of the cruel and unusual punishment proscription resulted, however, in a few isolated though important decisions in the
1940s and 1950s. One particularly significant decision and notorious case,Johnsonv. Dye, 6 1 involved a Georgia chain gang. The plain62
tiff had escaped from the gang and was arrested in Pennsylvania.
He there applied for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging brutal treatment from the Georgia prison officers and danger to his life if he
returned to the chain gang.6 3 The district judge denied him habeas
corpus relief, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circut reversed. 64 For the first time a federal court declared that a prison
environment entailed the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. 65 The flexible interpretation of the eighth amendment led to
66
the condemnation not only of physically barbarous punishments,
but also, as early as 1910, of punishment grossly disproportionate to
67
the severity of the crime.
In the 1960s, the prisoners' rights movement, centered on the
activist position of the Supreme Court, transformed the pariah status of the prisoner into that of a legal person. The eighth amendment played a key role in this process, rapidly becoming "one of the
new frontiers in creative constitutional law." 68 Although the
amendment had long been considered applicable only to federal activity, in 1962 the Court held that state statutes providing cruel and
unusual punishments violated both the eighth and the fourteenth
amendments. 69 The dynamic nature of the eighth amendment was
expressly emphasized by a 1958 ruling that the proscription's meaning must be drawn "from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."' 70 The flexibility of the
clause precludes a specific definition that could thwart its broadening significance "as society tends to pay more regard to human decency and dignity and becomes, or likes to think that it becomes,
61 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir.), rev'd, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
62 Id.

at 251.

63 Id. at 252.
64 Id. at 252-53 & 257.
65 Id. at 255. See L. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 143

(1975).
66

67
68
69
70

E.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878).
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
L. Berkson, supra note 65, at xiii.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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more humane. 7 1
In the 1970s, judicial decisions interpreted the eighth amendment clause as contemplating a purposive inquiry into prison conditions to measure them against permissible penal goals.7 2 In Gregg v.
Georgia,73 the Court established that "the sanction imposed cannot
be so totally without penological justification that it results in the
gratuitous infliction of suffering."' 74 The means-end test of prison
conditions is premised on the belief that nontrivial deprivations or
restraints in addition to incarceration must be justified by their contribution to the achievement of legitimate penal objectives. If arbitrary, such deprivations or restraints constitute a violation of the
75
cruel and unusual punishment clause.
Since the 1970s, the application of the cruel and unusual punishment clause to penitentiaries was the basis ofjudicial challenges
to state penal systems. The first of these cases, Holt v. Sarver,76 was
brought by inmates of a correctional institution in Arkansas in
1970. 77 After an exhaustive evidentiary hearing, reflected in a detailed memorandum opinion, the district judge concluded that conditions and practices in the Arkansas penitentiary system were such
that confinement itself amounted to cruel and unusual punishment
"even though a particular inmate may never personally be subjected
78
to any disciplinary action."
The absence of meaningful rehabilitation programs was an essential element in the Holt decision. The district judge was unwilling to hold that the Constitution required the institution to run a
"school, or provide vocational training, or other rehabilitative facilities and services which many institutions now offer."' 79 However,
the judge expressly stated that "the absence of an affirmative program of training and rehabilitation may have constitutional significance where in the absence of such a program conditions and
practices exist which actually militate against reform and rehabilitation." 80 The absence of a meaningful rehabilitation program alone
71 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 380 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971).
72 Feldberg, Confrontingthe Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for the Courts in
Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393 (1977).
73 428 U.S. 153 (1916).
74 Id. at 183.
75 Feldberg, supra note 72, at 395.
76 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
77 309 F. Supp. at 364.
78 Id. at 373.
79 Id. at 379.

80 Id.
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did not rise to constitutional relevance, rather it constituted "a factor in the overall constitutional equation" 8' when this absence
aggravated an already degrading and criminogenic prison environment.
After Holt v. Sarer,prisoners' challenges to prison systems proliferated. This led to decisions introducing comprehensive institutional reforms, although their unsatisfactory implementation often
resulted in embroiled litigation. Various decisions emphasized the
rehabilitative element in assessing overall prison conditions against
the eighth amendment's standard.8 2 In some cases the courts even
threatened to close the institution as a means of overcoming administrative resistance.
In Pugh v. Locke, 8 3 the district court determined that prison conditions were so debilitating that they necessarily deprived inmates of
any opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, or even to maintain skills
already possessed.8 4 Without recognizing a positive right to rehabilitation, the decision nevertheless stated that "a penal system cannot be operated in such a manner that it impedes an inmate's ability
to attempt rehabilitation,
or simply to avoid physical, mental or so85
cial deterioration.

Rehabilitation plays a dual role in the "totality of conditions"
analysis of correctional institutions. On the one hand, the lack of
rehabilitative programs is one of the elements making prison conditions unconstitutional; on the other hand, the inmates' opportunities to rehabilitate themselves or to maintain skills already possessed
serves as a yardstick against which the constitutionality of the cumulative effect of prison conditions is measured. The "totality of conditions" approach seemingly views rehabilitation as one element
relevant only in the aggregate of prison conditions. The absence of
rehabilitation often indicates unconstitutional conditions, but its
presence is not required when other factors are satisfactory. In
other words, rehabilitation seems to be reduced to a series of pro81 Id.
82 Rehabilitative considerations were included in Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318,

330 (M.D. Ala.), cert. denied sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Barnes v.
Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1227 (D.V.I. 1976); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp.
835, 900 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part and modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977);
James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp.
411, 415 (N.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 499 F.2d 387 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 983 (1975).
83 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala.), cert. denied sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 438 U.S.
915 (1978).
84 Id. at 326.
85 Id. at 330.
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grams directed towards counteracting the harmful effects of the institution on the inmates. These programs become constitutionally
mandatory when, without them, institutional flaws are sufficiently
serious to make confinement cruel and unusual punishment.
The role of rehabilitation, however, does not stop there. According to the case law developing the "totality of conditions" concept, the cumulative effect of prison conditions is unconstitutional
when they make it impossible to maintain acquired social skills or
continue efforts towards self-rehabilitation. 86 Here the courts employ the concept of rehabilitation as a gauge of the totality of prison
conditions. According to Laaman v. Helgemoe,8 7 the unconstitutionality lies in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain caused by
recidivism and future incarceration made probable by the overall
conditions of the prison. Prison conditions are thus constitutional
only when they make deterioration not inevitable and recidivism not
likely and when efforts toward self-rehabilitation are possible. A
constitutional right to rehabilitation thus encompasses the right to a
rehabilitative prison environment, which is one that does not make
degeneration probable or self-rehabilitation impossible.
Laaman v. Helgemoe represents one of the most significant applications of the eighth amendment to the totality of prison conditions.
The Laaman decision is significant both for its comprehensiveness
and far-reaching constitutional analysis. Laaman, the result of a civil
rights class action brought by inmates of the New Hampshire state
prison against prison officials, 8 8 concerned medical care, work, visitations, mail, education, rehabilitation and a general attack on the
conditions of confinement at the prison.8 9 A considerable number
of these conditions were alleged to be intolerable. For example, the
medical services were deficient and threatened the lives and health
of the inmates, the physical plant was inadequate, the cells were insalubrious and the lack of work offerings forced the prisoners into
stultifying idleness.9 0 Unreasonable restrictions on visitations prevented inmates from maintaining their community ties and family
bonds. 9 1 Mentally disturbed prisoners endangered others because
of the lack of mental health facilities. 9 2 Moreover, rehabilitative
86 See Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1315 (S.D. W. Va. 1981); Miller v.
Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 900 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part and modified in part, 563 F.2d
741 (5th Cir. 1977); James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
87 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977).
88 437 F. Supp. at 269 & 275.
89 Id. at 275.
90 Id. at 276-323.
91 Id. at 298-300.
92 Id. at 289-91.
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programs and classification of inmates were lacking. 93
District Judge Bownes' decision in Laaman was based on an extensive study of the prison conditions and included 75 separate orders to correct them.9 4 In addition, his constitutional analysis
improved the existing body of law built around the "totality of conditions" approach 9 5 by appraising them through the eighth amendment test set forth in Gregg v. Georgia 96 and subsequently applied in
Estelle v. Gamble.9 7 According to this test, the unconstitutionality lies
in punishment involving the "unnecessary infliction and wanton infliction of pain."9 8 In Laaman, it was established that the prison conditions were bound to result in "physical, mental or social
degeneration" and were "counterproductive to the inmates' efforts
to rehabilitate themselves." 99 An institution "where degeneration is
probable and self-improvement unlikely would cause unnecessary
suffering in the form of probable future incarceration."' 0 0 "Punishment for one crime, under conditions which spawn future crime and
more punishment, serves no valid legislative purpose and is so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous
infliction of suffering' in violation of the eighth amendment."'' 1 In
short, the violation of the eighth amendment was found to be the
result of the cumulative effect of various negative prison conditions
threatening "the physical, mental and emotional health and well-being of the inmates and/or creating a probability of recidivism and
future incarceration."'' 0 2 Judge Bownes emphasized that the institution's intolerable conditions lacked penological justification and
conflicted with the state's correctional goals. He pointed out that
the penological goal of rehabilitation was expressly required by the
New Hampshire Constitution, statutory provisions and judical pronouncements.' 0 3 While he qualified those provisions as statements
of general purpose and intent which did not create substantive
rights, he pointed out that "New Hampshire espouses reform as a
10 4
primary goal of its correctional system."'
In this manner, Laaman established a negative indirect right to
93 Id. at 300-01.
94 Id. at 275-304.
95 See Note, The Right to Rehabilitation: Laaman v. Helgemoe, 6 BLACK LJ. 303 (1978).
96 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
97 429 U.S. 97 (1978).
98
99

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
437 F. Supp. at 318.

100 Id. at 316.

101 Id.
102 Id. at 323.
103 Id. at 315.
104 Id.
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rehabilitation as a consequence of a right not to degenerate. In consonance with precedent, this right includes the freedom to attempt
rehabilitation or the "cultivation of new socially acceptable and useful skills and habits" 10 5 and the provision of adequate mental health
care. 10 6 The corresponding obligation of the state to provide opportunities to stave off degeneration and to minimize impediments
to reform is measured through the totality of the conditions of confinement. Remedial orders must be issued by the courts when these
"conditions create an environment in which it is impossible for inmates to rehabilitate themselves-or to preserve skills and constructive attitudes already possessed-even for those who are inclined to
do SO."1107
In this connection, following precedent' 0 8 and the prisoner's
right to work under New Hampshire statutes, the court ordered the
prison administration to institute work opportunities and vocational
training' 0 9 "in order to minimize degeneration and succor what rehabilitative attempts were being made by inmates.""10
The Laaman decision also held that unreasonable restrictions
on visitations violates the eighth amendment when "failure to allow
inmates to keep their community ties and family bonds promotes
degeneration and decreases their chances of successful reintegration into society." 1 1 ' The court also ordered the establishment of a
classification system as " 'absolutely necessary, if effective rehabilitation is to take place.' 1112 Such a classification system was to be
used for the application of specific educational, vocational and rehabilitative programs. The provision of adequate mental health care
was also a relevant rehabilitative element considered in the court's
3

decree."1

As a means of advancing the rights of prisoners, the "totality of
conditions" approach has encountered some setbacks in recent
years. The Supreme Court decison in Rhodes v. Chapman 1 4 has
proven that this approach is a "double-edged sword." 115 In the
105 Id. at 316.
106 Id. at 319.

107 Id. at 317 (quoting Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 326 (M.D. Ala.), cert.
deniedsub
nom. Newman v. Alabama, 438 U.S. 915 (1978)).
108 E.g., Barnes v. Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1228 (D.V.I. 1976).
109 437 F. Supp. 269, 329 (D.N.H. 1977).
110 Id. at 318.
111 Id. at 320.
112 Id. at 319.
113 Id. at 324.

114 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
115 Comment, FederalIntervention in State Prisons: The Modern Prison-ConditionsCase, 19
HOUSTON L. REv. 931, 947 (1982).
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concurring opinion of Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens,
double-ceiling was seen as one condition among many to be considered when determining the constitutionality of the cumulative effect. Following the reasoning of Laaman, the Court stated that the
"touchstone" of the eighth amendment inquiry is "the effect upon
the imprisoned."' 1 6 This rationale conceded that favorable conditions-adequate shelter, food, protection and opportunities for education, work and rehabilitative assistance-compensated for, and
ultimately offset, the harsher condition of double-celling. This interpretation could lead to the incorrect conclusion that some positive aspects of a prison can compensate for conditions that are
clearly unconstitutional in and of themselves, such as horrendous
overcrowding, 1 7 racial discrimination, ' 8 and the everyday occurence of serious prison violence. " 9 The fact that some violations
of the eighth amendment result from an aggregate effect of several
conditions does not mean that the observance of constitutional
norms regarding a certain number of conditions can legitimate
other conditions that alone are unconstitutional. The danger of
such a mistaken inference demands a more precise definition of the
role of rehabilitation in the "totality of conditions" approach.
True, the lack of rehabilitative efforts is more visible when
prison conditions descend to their lowest levels of squalor and degradation, but it would be totally discordant with a liberty-centered
concept of rehabilitation to assert that the existence of a rehabilitation program could render intolerable deprivations constitutional.
To consider, for example, that a vocational training program could
legitimate the existence of cells infested with vermin demonstrates
ad-absurdum the vulnerability of such an argument. Within the "totality of conditions" approach, rehabilitation is not to be traded-off
against flaws that have a specific remedy (e.g., cleaning the facilities)
but is intended to counteract the overall harmful effects of institutionalization such as depersonalization or loss of self-determination.
A rehabilitation-oriented institution depends less on particular programs than on improvements in overall prison conditions that reduce the level of desocialization or dehabilitation. Rehabilitation is
necessary even in well-functioning institutions as a consequence of
116

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 364.

117 See Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 323.
118

Id. at 325.

119 Note, Laaman v. Helgemoe: Degeneration, Recidivism and the Eighth Amendment, 3 VT.

L. REv. 229, 243, 248 (1978)(quoting Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 323; Williams v. Edwards,
547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd,
442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971)).
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incarceration alone. Between the filth and squalor described by
John Howard in the eighteenth century120 and the modem problemsolving communities within walls 12 1 there is a continuum of
harmfulness and deterioration. Where to draw the line that makes
the absence of positive rehabilitative attempts unconstitutional depends on those "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 122 Besides, the Rhodes v. Chapman view
that some favorable conditions could compensate for the constitutional violation of others loses sight of the fact that a primary goal of
rehabilitative endeavors is to fortify the legal status of prisoners. A
genuine rehabilitative concept therefore can never be used as a pretext to justify the abridgement of prisoners' basic rights.
Another judicial trend adverse to the recognition of rehabilitation as a right departs from the "totality of conditions" approach.
Some lower federal courts have recently denied that the cumulative
effect of several conditions violates the eighth amendment in cases
where no single condition is violatory. 12 3 This interpretation tends
to undermine the significance attached by precedent to the lack of
rehabilitation, insofar as the absence of rehabilitation alone was not
considered unconstitutional. As a result the failure of prisons to
provide rehabilitative programs loses its potential to contribute to
the totality of conditions liable to violate the eight amendment.
This step back from the progressive interpretation of the eighth
amendment jeopardizes the limited role recognized for rehabilitation since Holt v. Sarver.124 Moreover, these decisions indicate a return to the hands-off policy that endangers the totality of prisoners'
rights. This perilous judicial retreat coincides with the short-sighted
satisfaction of the court in Newman v. Alabama 125 which held that
stultifying and deteriorating prison life is constitutional so long as
shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety are provided. 126 This ruling ignores the nature of human needs.
A constitutionally permissible prison environment includes a
right to rehabilitation in the indirect form of inmates' rights not to
degenerate or to be impaired in their own rehabilitative efforts. The
120

J. Howard, The State of Prisons (1777).

121 See, e.g., H. ToCH, THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITIES IN CORRECTIONS (1980).

122 Trop v. Dulles, U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
123 Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Franzen v.
Duckworth, 107 S. Ct. 71 (1986); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir.
1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and vacated in part sub nom. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801
F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986).
124 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. (1971).
125 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983).
126 Id. at 292.
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question of whether such a negative right entitles a prisoner to
claims for specific programs was answered negatively by the
Supreme Court of Washington in Bresolin v. Morris.127 However, the
dissenting opinion in that case warrants analysis as an important
contribution to an alternative constitutional doctrine.
The majority decision rejected a writ of mandamus ordering the
transfer of a prisoner to a drug addiction treatment program at a
state hospital. 128 An inmate of the state correctional institute at
Walla Walla brought the action. 29 The inmate sought to compel
the Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services to
establish and maintain a drug treatment program at the institution. 130 Because the needed facilities would have been very expensive, the legislature enacted a law making the establishment of a
drug treatment program discretionary instead of mandatory.' 3 ' In
the meantime, the petitioner found an alternative form of relief
through transfer to another hospital. 3 2 Nevertheless, the great
public relevance of the questions involved in the case persuaded the
l
court to consider it. 33
The majority rejected the notion that the eighth amendment
gave prisoners a right to rehabilitative treatment for psychological
dependence on drugs.' 34 The court ruled that a prisoner does not
have a right to rehabilitation and denied that the failure to rehabilitate amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.' 3 5 The court based
its ruling on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Procunier
v. Martinez, 13 6 which considered rehabilitation a "governmental interest" and not an enforceable right. 137 The court also rested on a
"realist" view of the prison situation, a skeptical appraisal of the results achieved by drug rehabilitation programs and an assumption
13
that rehabilitation as a whole is ineffective.
In his dissent, Justice Utter applied the idea of an indirect right
to rehabilitation in the sense of a right to avoid deterioration.' 3 9 On
this basis he would have affirmed the prisoner's constitutional right
127 80 Wash. 2d 167, 558 P.2d 1350 (1977).
128 Id. at 174, 558 P.2d at 1354.
129 Id. at 168, 558 P.2d at 1350.
130 Id., 558 P.2d at 1350.
'3' Id., 558 P.2d at 1351.
132 Id. at 169, 558 P.2d at 1351.
133 Id., 558 P.2d at 1351.
134 Id. at 174, 558 P.2d at 1354.
135 Id., 558 P.2d at 1354.
136 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
137 Id. at 404-06.
138 Id. at 404-05.
139 80 Wash. 2d at 175, 558 P.2d at 1354 (Utter, J., dissenting).
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to a specific drug rehabilitation program, deeming its absence a violation of the eighth amendment. 140 Justice Utter also relied on sociological data. Instead of accepting that imprisonment inevitably
brings harmful consequences, Justice Utter affirmed a peremptory
duty of the state to counteract these consequences. 14 1 He underlined the responsibility contracted by the state by placing an inmate
with an addictive personality in a closed setting where his addiction
is exacerbated by an atmosphere of apparently uncontrollable dealing in and use of drugs. 14 2 In Estelle v. Gamble, regarding the right
of prisoners to medical treatment in general, the Supreme Court
recognized that" 'it is but just that the public be required to care for
the prisoner, who cannot, by reason of the deprivation of his liberty,
care for himself.' "143 This duty of care for the prisoner, Justice Utter argued, is all the more pressing when an individual psychologically addicted to the use of narcotic drugs is placed in a situation of
"continued explosive degeneration," inherent to state institutions,
"creating thus a great likelihood that such individuals will do further
14 4
injury to society when they are eventually released."'
Justice Utter stated that the relief requested in the case did not
require, as the majority insisted, that the court recognize a constitutionally-based, broad right to rehabilitation. 14 5 The factual framework of the case presented a narrow, albeit important, issue
concerning the constitutional right of inmates with addictive personalities to be protected from physical and mental harm resulting
from confinement in an institution in which they are unavoidably
exposed to unlawful narcotics. In this case, the lack of a drug treatment program implied the deprivation of needed medical care,
which includes the healing of the mind. Such deprivation represents suffering beyond that of incarceration, thus constituting cruel
and unusual punishment. The right to a specific treatment intended
to avoid the intensification of an individual's psychological addiction
is another instance of the right to counteract the degenerative effects of penal institutions. In the Laaman decision mentioned
above, 14 6 this right represents a negative right to rehabilitation.
Id., 558 P.2d at 1354 (Utter, J., dissenting).
Id., 558 P.2d at 1354 (Utter, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 175-76, 558 P.2d at 1354-55 (Utter, J., dissenting).
143 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1978)(quoting Spicer v. Williams, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E.
291, 293 (1926)).
144 80 Wash. 2d at 175, 558 P.2d at 1356 (Utter, J., dissenting).
145 Id., 558 P.2d at 1356 (Utter, J., dissenting).
146 See supra notes 87-113 and accompanying text.
140
141
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VIII.

THE RIGHT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC
TREATMENT AS PART OF THE RIGHT TO REHABILITATION

The recognition of a limited right of prisoners to psychological
and psychiatric treatment is represented at the federal level by the
leading case of Bowring v. Godwin.' 4 7 This right stems from a progressive interpretation of the eighth amendment and "is also premised upon notions of rehabilitation and the desire to render
inmates useful and productive citizens upon their release."' 48
According to the combined doctrine of Estelle v. Gamble1 4 9 and
Gregg v. Georgia,150 untreated medical needs constitute an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" that infringes on the right guaranteed by the eighth amendment. In Bowring, the Fourth Circuit
formulated a test to determine when those needs should entitle a
prisoner to psychological and psychiatric treatment. The court
stated that if a physician or other health care provider, exercising
ordinary care at the time of observation, concluded with reasonable
medical certainty that the petitioner's symptoms evidenced a serious
disease or injury, that such "disease or injury was curable or might
be substantially alleviated, and that potential for harm to petitioner

by reason of delay or denial of care would be substantial,"' 15 1 then
the prisoner had a right to treatment.
The Bowring decision recognized rehabilitation as a paramount
goal of the corrections system even though it is not mandated by
any particular constitutional provision.' 52 The Court also stated
that this judicial recognition helped establish the right, based on the
eighth amendment, to psychological treatment. 153 Psychotherapy is
147 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
148 Id. at 48.
149 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
150 428 U.S. 153 (1976).

151 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977). An interesting application of this doctrine is contained in an action initiated by an amended petition for a writ for habeas corpus filed by
an inmate seeking a Depo-provera drug treatment to control his deviant sexual disorders. McDonald v. Bronson, No. 84-32654 (Conn. Sup. Ct. TollandJud. Dist., Rockville
Nov. 30, 1984). The petitioner claimed that the denial of such treatment by Connecticut
violated the eighth amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Petitioner's Memorandum of Law at 13-18, McDonald v. Bronson, No. 84-32654
(Conn. Sup. Ct. TollandJud. Dist., Rockville Nov. 30, 1984). A settlement was reached
with the State, through which Depo-provera was provided. Voluntary consent does not
always appear with such clarity as in McDonald. In some special cases, Depo-provera
appears to be the only option left that might allow sex offenders to live in society, and it
might thus be incorporated into the right to rehabilitation. On ethical problems, guidelines for informed consent and selection of candidates, see Comment, Sex Offenders and
the Use of Depo-provera, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 565 (1985).
152 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977). See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
153 Bomring, 551 F.2d at 48. See Note, PrisonersRights-Bowring v. Godwin: The Limited
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a principal ingredient of a modem rehabilitative concept, especially
when applied to mentally disordered offenders. The concept of
medical necessity on which the Bowring decision is based includes
psychological disorder in its broader sense and thus confers the status of a right on this important aspect of rehabilitation.
Arguments similar to those of Bowring were used as a basis for a
1978 decision of the Supreme Court of Alaska. The court established that William Rust, a prisoner in custody of the Division of
Corrections, was entitled to receive treatment for his dyslexic condition. 154 At sentencing, the superior court found that the defendant
Rust needed reading therapy and vocational training and that his
confinement should take place in an area where his family lived.1 55
Furthermore, the court affirmed its continuing jurisdiction of the
matter in order to supervise its accomplishment and to redress failure to provide special conditions. 156 Shortly after the superior
court's entry ofjudgment, however, Rust was classified to be sent to
a different unit not meeting the conditions recommended in the
sentence. 15 7 The sentencing court denied Rust's motion seeking an
immediate order to the Division of Corrections to modify this classification. 158 The court held that it lacked the legal authority to issue
such an order. 159 Rust appealed this decision but it was confirmed
by the Supreme Court of Alaska. 160 The Supreme Court declared
that the matter of prisoners' classifications was committed by statutory provisions to the discretion of the executive branch and was not
subject to the review or control of the courts. 16 1 Rust's claims for
16 2
the treatment of his dyslexic conditions, however, were accepted.
The matter was consequently remanded to the superior court for
further proceedings to determine the seriousness of the prisoner's
disease or injury.' 63 If necessary, he was to have the right to receive
treatment and to be transferred to a newly-assigned unit.
The arguments presented in this decision are significant in their
connection with the right to rehabilitation. The court stressed that
Rust was sentenced under police power for a limited period and
Right of State Prisoners to Psychological and Psychiatric Treatment, 56 N.C.L.
(1978).
154 Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).
155 Id. at 135.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 136.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 144.
161 Id. at 137.
162 Id. at 143.
163 Id. at 144.

REv.

612, 614
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with full due process safeguards. 164 That is, his case should not be
treated as entirely analogous to those of people such as juveniles
and mental patients confined under aparenspatriae165 rationale. The
Supreme Court of Alaska, however, affirmed that there is a public
obligation to care for persons deprived of their liberties and cited
the numerous precedents considering the lack of adequate food,
clothing, shelter, medical care facilities and staff as constitutional violations of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.' 6 6 The tests to
determine when those needs should entitle one to treatment were
derived from Bowring v. Godwin.
Besides the right to treatment derived from the eighth amendment and from the common law duty of care for the prisoner, "who
cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty care for himself," 16 7 the right to treatment for certain categories of offenders
has also been premised on the fourteenth amendment. This approach originated in lower courts' decisions in the field of mental
health.168 Treatment in these cases needs to compensate for the restriction of procedural safeguards resulting from the indeterminate
confinement of these offenders with alleged therapeutic purposes.
The absence of the "quid pro quo" of treatment was seen as a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Courts
have recognized this right to treatment not only for involuntarily
committed patients but also for juvenile offenders and offenders
with mental disorders. These include sexual psychopaths 169 and
persons convicted under "guilty but mentally ill" statutes. 170 The
rationale of the above-mentioned courts for extending a fourteenth
164 Id. at 140.
165 Id. at 139-40.
166 Id.

at 139-43.

167 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Spicer v. Williams, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E.

291, 293 (1926)).

168 See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.

Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 131 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part, reversed in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d. 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court, however, refused to affirm a constitutional right to treatment for mentally ill patients and expressly left the question unsettled. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The Supreme Court only recently
recognized a right to a minimally adequate training and habilitation for the mentally
retarded. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). See also Rotman, Rechtliche Voraussetzungen der Behandlunggeistesgest6"rter Straftdterin den Vereinigten Staaten, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR
GiJNTER BLAu 555-72 (1985).
169 E.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775
(9th Cir. 1980).
170 See Comment, Punishment Versus Treatment of Guilty But Mentally Ill, 74J. CRIM. LAW
& CRIMINOLOGY 428, 456 n.2 (1983). In Fentiman, Guilty But Mentally IlI: The Real Verdict
is Guilty, 26 B.C.L. REV. 601, 652 (1985), the author points out that "fuin practice, the
psychiatric treatment accorded [these] inmates tends to be either minimal or nonexis-
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amendment right to treatment to mentally disordered and juvenile
offenders is that "whenever the provision of care and treatment is
part of the purpose for confinement, such must be accorded consistent with due process." 171 Some decisions have considered that a
rehabilitative purpose of confinement must be inferred whenever
the term of sentence is indefinite. 17 2 Although these decisions were
made in the context of sexual psychopath statutes, the same rationale could be applied to the indeterminate sentencing 173 of all
prisoners.

IX.

ARGUMENTS BASED ON THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

The affirmation of a constitutional right to rehabilitation based
on equal protection assumes that the prisoner maintains all basic
rights not incompatible with incarceration.' 74 The leading case, Coffin v. Reichard,175 holds that prisoners retain all civil rights except
those expressly taken by law or those whose removal is necessary to
the attainment of legitimate penal goals.' 7 6 The courts have determined that although lawful incarceration brings about the withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, "it is well
established that prisoners do not lose all their constitutional rights
and that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the fourteenth amendment follow them into prison and there protect them
17 7
from unconstitutional action on the part of prison authorities."'
The equal protection clause has been successfully invoked to re178 sex, 17 9
move inequalities within the prison system based on race,
and differential treatment when not justified by valid circum80
stances.'
tent." Denial of their constitutional right to treatment is one of the bases on which the
author questions the constitutionality of the "guilty but mentally ill" statutes. Id. at 615.
171 Rone v Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 119 (N.D. Ohio 1979).

172 Ohlinger v. Watson,, 652 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1980); Slotkin v. Brookdale Hosp.
Center, 357 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
173 See Frankel, supra note 4, at 28-34.
174 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 547-48 (1984)(Stevens, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part).
175 143 F.2d. 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
176 Id. at 445.
177

Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd mem., 390 U.S.

333 (1968).
178 Id.
179 See Note, Women's Prisons: An Equal Protection Evaluation, 94 YALE L.J. 1182-1206
(1985).
180 See Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233
N.E.2d 908 (1968) (upholding differences of treatment but recognizing the possibility of
a violation of equal protection).
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Morales v. Schmidt, 18 1 although reversed on appeal, 18 2 opened an
important line of argument to support a constitutional right to rehabilitation. The district court held that the equal protection clause
applies not only within the group of persons convicted of a crime,
but also to governmental treatment that distinguishes this group
from the general population. 18 3 The governmental differentiation
between those convicted of a crime and those not convicted of a
crime "should not escape the judicial scrutiny borne by other governmental classifications for the purpose of differential treatment."' 184 The court decided that if the distinction between the two
classes bears upon an individual interest considered to be "fundamental," then the burden will be upon the government to show a
compelling state interest in the differential treatment.' 8 5 In short,
convicts and the general public were assimilated in their rights to
the equal protection of law. Commenting on this decision, Dwyer
and Botein asserted that "[d]epriving prisoners of rehabilitation...
would deny them equal protection if an almost identical right to re86
habilitation applies to similarly situated non-prisoners."'
The Morales approach is premised on the assumption that rehabilitation, as a method of public protection, is a primary correctional
goal. To withold rehabilitation therefore would be inconsistent with
the governmental purpose of imprisonment. According to Dwyer
and Botein's reasoning, the right to rehabilitation based on equal
protection is also bolstered by the affirmation of a right to treatment
87
benefitting a disadvantaged sector of the general population.'
This sector is composed of nonprisoners deprived of their liberty
and "officially... in need of services."' 188 This right to treatment,
coinciding to a considerable extent with the right to rehabilitation,
disproves the counterargument that the general public lacks such a
right. Thus, the assumed presence of a treatment group within the
general public is used as an equal protection argument against the
denial of rehabilitation to prison inmates. The denial of rehabilitaCir. 1973).
182 Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973). The district court decided that
conviction was sufficient justification for differential treatment of prisoners without requiring a demonstration of "compelling state interest." Id. at 1341-42.
183 340 F. Supp. at 549-50.
181 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd, 489 F.2d 1335 (7th

184 Id. at 550.
185 Id.
186 Dwyer & Botein, supra note 57, at 284.
187 In spite of the promising legal developments at the time Dwyer and Botein wrote
their article, the Supreme Court later refused to rule on the question whether mental
patients have a constitutional right to treatment. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
573 (1975).
188 Dwyer & Botein, supra note 57, at 285.
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tion deprives prisoners of equal protection because the general public has such a right. By removing a prisoner's ability to find
appropriate treatment services, "a prison arguably incurs the responsibility of making these services available."' 8 9
The existence of a treatment group within the general population is used only as a supplemental argument in Dwyer and Botein's
analysis. 190 The primary reference in the equal protection argument is the general public. This is important because it means that
the right to rehabilitation does not depend on the existence of a
right to treatment, a question left unsettled by the Supreme
Court. 19 1 Rather, the right depends on the recognition that the offender is a citizen whose rights have been withdrawn or limited to a
degree required by legitimate penal goals. This is consistent with
the notion that convicted persons are "not sent to a penal institution to receive additional punishment: the fact of incarceration itself
is the punishment."' 1 92 Furthermore, the idea of equal protection is
extended by Dwyer and Botein to require that prisons use the leastrestrictive alternative, as in treatment cases within the general population.1 9 3 In their equal protection argument, Dywer and Botein
also demand a liberal construction of state constitutional and statutory provisions which establish rehabilitation as a right of prisoners. 1 94 They relied in this argument on Rouse v. Cameron,195 which
stressed the duty of the state to provide rehabilitative services to
persons denied the possibility of seeking them on their own.
Dwyer and Botein assimilate rehabilitation and treatment to a
large extent yet they concede that the two concepts are not synonymous. 196 Their interpretative efforts point toward the many ways
these concepts overlap. A broader application of the equal protection clause as an argument for establishing a constitutional right to
rehabilitation, however, should go beyond a strict therapeutic
model of rehabilitation. In medicine, disease is no longer seen as an
exclusively biochemical or neurophysiological process. Quite the
contrary, it is now considered a problem of living, and therapy
means a concern with the totality of human life.' 9 7 Psychiatry has
Dwyer & Botein, supra note 57, at 285.
190 Dwyer & Botein, supra note 57.
191 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
192 Barnes v. Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. at 1219.
193 Dwyer & Botein, supra note 57, at 286-89.
194 Dwyer & Botein, supra note 57, at 288.
195 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
196 Dwyer & Botein, supra note 57, at 284 n.60.
197 Engel, The Need for a New Medical Model" A Challengefor Biomedicine, 196 Sci. 132
(1977).
189
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also moved toward a more integrated approach including the social
19 8
dimension of the patient's life.
It was precisely the input of social psychiatry in corrections that
gave rise to the most important rehabilitative experiments of the
twentieth century conducted by a number of European social therapeutic institutions. 199 The rich spectrum of theory and research
generated in various scientific disciplines regarding the idea of socialization created a significant conceptual framework to guide rehabilitative endeavors. Based on an understanding of human
development since early childhood, the social learning approach
made it possible to design surrogate forms of socialization to be applied in correctional institutions and community-based programs.
The recent emphasis on the possibilities of adult socialization 20 0 favors the conception of corrections as a social learning and educational undertaking. The evolution of therapeutic approaches to
20 1
mentally disordered offenders towards a social learning model
also reinforces this view of corrections.
Psychotherapeutic treatment is only one component of the current concept of rehabilitation which encompasses a series of socialization offerings, and integrates a learning process directed to
overcoming a variety of social and psychological insufficiencies.
These range from deep psychological conflict that prompts aggressive behavior to a lack of skills that prevents the individual from entering the labor market. Rehabilitation today encompasses
meaningful work and education as well as treatment. 20 2 Furthermore, the recognition of the prisoner as a possessor of rights has a
secondary rehabilitative effect. Many of the prisoner's basic rights
allow him to maintain social relations with the world outside or increase his or her feeling of dignity and self-worth.
198 Burch & Burch, The Congestive Heart Failure Model of Schizophrenia, 241 J. A.M.A.

1925 (1979).
199

See, e.g., R.

EGG, STRAFFXLLIGKEIT UND SOZIALTHERAPIE

(1984); G.

NER & H. SCHOCH, STRAFVOLLZUG 282-94 (1977); K. ROTrHAUS,

H.

KAISER,

SCHWIND &

H. KER-

G.

BLAU,

STRAFVOLLZUG IN DER PRAxIs 70-77 (1976); Dinkel, Nemec, & Rosner, Organisationstrukur, Behandlungsmassnahmenund Verdnderungen bei Insassen in einer sozialtherapeutischenAn-

stalt, 69 MSCHRKRIM 1-21 (1986); Rotman, El Tratamiento Socioterapiuticode Delincuentes en
la Clhnica Dr. Henri van der Hoeven, in CONGRESO PANAMERICANO DE CRIMINOLOGIA (Buenos Aires) (1979); Rotthaus, Sozialtherapiein derJustizvolhugsanstaltGelsenkirchen, ZTSTRVo
2-12 (1981); Rotthaus, Die neue Dr.-van-der-Hoeven-Kliniek in Utrecht, 61 MSCHRKRIM 126-

34 (1978).
200 See J.

KAGAN,

THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 12 (1984); Brim, Adult Socialization, in

SOCIALIZATION AND SOCIETY 185 & 195-96 (J. Clausen 1968).
201 E.g., F. DUNKEL, LEGALBEWAHRUNG NACH SOZIALTHERAPEUTISCHER

BEHANDLUNG

134-39 (1980).
202 The importance of skill training as a rehabilitative option is underlined by Halleck
& Witte, supra note 47, within the category of opportunity-changing programs.
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The application of the equal protection clause to a global rehabilitative concept should consider the various component elements
of rehabilitation, involving therapy, education and social learning.
If prisoners should have the same rights as other citizens, except
when a compelling governmental interest in public protection absolutely demands otherwise, the scope of the equal protection inquiry
is enlarged considerably. An equal protection inquiry should first
determine the extent to which education, work, vocational training,
therapy or any other rehabilitative component has become a legally
enforceable right of the public. The second stage of the inquiry
should determine whether the exercise of such rights can be legitimately curtailed or abolished because one is imprisoned.
The question then arises whether the concept of legal punishment can be limited to deprivation of freedom. Rejecting this limitation is equivalent to accepting all the deteriorating effects caused
by sterile warehousing in an atmosphere of idleness and potential
violence. Denying the prisoner's right to counteractive measures
amounts to a definition of punishment that includes the reversion of
human development, the loss of capacity and of mental and social
health. Such a concept of punishment could never claim to be civilized. If punishment is to conform to its overt legal objectives, the
state must guarantee the equal protection of inmates' basic rights.
Meaningful rehabilitative programs must be developed to counteract the degrading and socially detrimental situation of incarcerated
prisoners. This legal obligation of the state should correspond to
the rights of inmates to education, vocational instruction and maintenance of acquired skills, mental health and remunerated work in
the same way they belong to other citizens.
In the search for an equal protection argument for a constitutional right to rehabilitation, it is important to remember that state
constitutions can be supplemental sources of constitutional protection.20 3 Rehabilitation is included in the bill of rights of a number
of state constitutions 20 4 which are thus a direct source of the constitutional right in question. In addition, another fundamental state
right, the right to education, 20 5 is a part of the rehabilitative structure. Its hierarchical position in the legal system offers a new basis
203 Sedler, The State Constitutions and the Supplemental Protection of IndividualRights, 18 U.
TOL. L. REV. 465, 475 (1985).
204 See infra section XI, "State Constitutions."
205 Morgan, FundamentalState Rights: A New Basisfor Strict Scrutiny in Federal Equal Pro-

tection Review, 17 GA. L. REV. 77, 103 (1982)(stating that "[e]ducation is the most obvious
candidate for treatment under a fundamental state rights approach hecause, as previously indicated, almost all state constitutions have explicit educational guarantees and
several state courts have held that education is a fundamental state right.").
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for strict scrutiny in federal equal protection review. 20 6 Thus, classifications impinging upon such rights, such as the category of convicted imprisoned offenders, could violate the equal protection
clause if they are not adequately compensated for by rehabilitative
services as education, re-education or basic vocational training.
Like the disabled, many criminal offenders suffer from social
handicaps. This similarity suggests another application of the equal
protection theory. Here comparative law offers an important precedent in the recognition of a constitutional right to rehabilitation via
equal protection. The Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic
of Germany, in the Lehbach case 20 7 declared it an active duty of the
state to rehabilitate criminal offenders based on the general constitutional duty of the state to protect and care for the socially disadvantaged (Sozialstaatsprinzip).2 08 The decision was premised on a
view of criminal offenders as psychologically handicapped and consequently in need of resocialization-oriented compensatory action. 20 9 The assimilation of prisoners and former convicts to the
vast group of those handicapped in personal and social development creates a new perspective for future applications of the equal
protection theory to the rehabilitation of criminal offenders. Such
an interpretation should introduce into the constitutional equation
the social welfare and rehabilitation programs to which the disabled
are entitled.
One could also view a right to rehabilitation as a right to minimum protection, following the strategy developed by Michelman for
"instances in which individuals have important needs or interests
which they are prevented from satisfying because of traits or predicaments not adopted by free and proximate choice." 21 0 In those
cases the equal protection clause is used as a textual base for litiga2 11
tion inspired or shaped by minimum-protection thinking.
A right to minimum protection should be founded on the correlative duty of the state to satisfy certain basic wants resulting from
its punitive action but unrelated to the legitimate goals of legal punishment. The denial of opportunities for rehabilitation, at either the
educational, labor or therapeutic level, inevitably degrades the
warehoused offender. Such nefarious consequences of imprisonId. at 92-107.
Judgment ofJune 5, 1973, Bundesverfassungsgericht (W. Ger.), 35 BVerfGE 202.
See supra note 2.
208 Art. 20,
1, of the Fundamental Law.
209 Judgment ofJune 5, 1973, Bundesverfassungsgericht (W. Ger.), 35 BVerfGE 202.
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210 Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REv. 7, 35 (1969).
211 Id. at 33 n.78.
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ment play no part in the legal design of criminal sanctions, and the
offender cannot be supposed to have foreseen them before committing a crime. The lack of all positive assistance is equivalent to
throwing the prisoner into a state of social deprivation exceeding
the normal consequences of liberty deprivation. His or her situation
would be similar to that of the impecunious person who "is denied
access of certain goods or activities because of some trait or situation which he is powerless to change currently and which is not the
result of any decision freely made by him in the proximate past. '21 2
In subjecting a human being to criminal punishment, the state must
guard against exceeding the legal scope of its repressive task. The
only way to prevent or compensate for unjustified deprivations is to
carry out a positive program of rehabilitative action.
X.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAw

International law, applied as part of domestic United States law,
is another source of constitutional interpretation supporting a right
to rehabilitation. This principle, which includes the application of
customary international law by American courts, was established by
the Supreme Court in 1900 in The Paquete Habana.2 13 According to
this decision, "when there is no treaty and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and the usages of civilized nations; and as evidence of these, to
the works of commentators.... for trustworthy evidence of what the
'
law really is." 214
Customary international law is defined by the Statute of the International Court ofJustice as a "general practice accepted by law"
and binding on the world community. 2 15 Customary international
law demands (1) a "concordant practice by a number of States,
(2) and [their belief] that an action is required by, or consisent with,
international law."'2 16 In this regard, human rights advocates have
sought recognition of a right to education by invoking customary
law expressed in international instruments as a source of human
rights law. 21 7 In cases of a gap in constitutional protections, "fundamental human rights norms as established by traditional sources of
212 Id. at 33.
213 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
214 Id. at 700.
215 Comment, Plyler v. Doe and the Right of Undocumented Alien Children to a Free Public
Education, 2 B.U. INT'L LJ. 513, 523 (1984)(citing Statute of the International Court of

Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, art. 338(1)(a)).
216 Id.
217 See id.; Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform ConstitutionalInterpreta-

tion,4 Hous.J. INT'L L. 39, 53 (1981).
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customary international law may be used to help fill the lacunae with
2 18
substantive principles."
Bilder believes that international standards are more likely to
be invoked to protect "peripheral and less generally accepted types
of alleged rights" than to protect the "core" civil and political rights
which are already covered by domestic law. He further points to the
positive influence of subtler factors, such as national pride in a
human rights tradition. "A United States court may be reluctant to
expressly find that United States domestic law protecting human
rights has significant gaps' which it can fill only by drawing on international law sources, or that the United States has something to
'21 9
learn in this regard from other nations.
In Lareau v. Manson,220 the court used customary international
law as a basis for declaring the overcrowded conditions of the Hartford Community Correctional Center in violation of the eighth
amendment. 221 The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners were cited as a significant "expression of
the obligations to the international community of the member states
of the United Nations .... and as part of the body of international
law (including customary international law) concerning human
rights which has been built upon the foundation of the United Nations Charter." 2 22 In fact, the Standards Minimum Rules had been
adopted as a preamble to the Administrative Directives to the Connecticut Department of Corrections. Although the Rules are not
necessarily applicable in the United States, the court considered
them "an authoritative international statement of basic norms of
human dignity and of certain practices which are repugnant to the
223
conscience of mankind."
The Standard Minimum Rules were also invoked by the
Supreme Court of Oregon in its decision that the search of male
prisoners by female corrections officers violated Oregon's constitutional prohibition against cruel and degrading punishment. 2 24 The
court stated that the case involved the application of Oregon's bill
of rights, stating that laws for the punishment of crime shall be
Christenson, supra note 217, at 55.
Bilder, IntegratingInternationalHuman Rights Law into Domestic Law-U.S. Experience,
4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1981).
220 Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd in part and modified in
part, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
221 507 F. Supp. at 1187-88 n.9.
222 Id. at 1188.
223 Id.
224 Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 603, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
218

219
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designed for reformation, and not for "vindictive justice." 2 25 This
interpretation is reinforced by both the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the Standard Minimum Rules, which also estab22 6
lish rehabilitation as an essential aim of the penitentiary system.
A variety of sources strongly support the existence of a right to
rehabilitation based on customary international law. The United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
adopted in 1955, provide in article 58:
The purpose and justification of a sentence of imprisonment or a similar measure deprivative of liberty is ultimately to protect society
against crime. This end can only be achieved if the period of imprisonment is used to ensure, so far as possible, that upon his return to
society the offender is not only willing but able to lead a law-abiding
and self-supporting life.
In other articles this document prescribes detailed guidelines for an
individualized and integral rehabilitative action. 2 27 The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in force
since 1976, establishes that "[t]he penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their
reformation and social rehabilitation. ' 228 The American Covention
of Human Rights, entered into in 1978, provides that "[p]unishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essen'22 9
tial aim the reform and social readaptation of prisoners.
XI.

STATE CONsTITuTIONS

Several state constitutions can serve as a significant source for
the constitutional status of a right to rehabilitation. During the
1960s, the Supreme Court relied on the federal Constitution to initiate more comprehensive protection of the rights of people. But
after the Court's retreat from political activism during the 1970s,
the states' bills of rights gradually regained their prominent role.
The principle of federalism is being used to expand rights, and state
judges are scrutinizing state constitutions in order to create a body
of civil liberties going beyond current interpretations by the
Supreme Court.
225
226
227

Id. at 616, 625 P.2d at 128.
Id. at 622 n.21, 625 P.2d at 131 n.21.

The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, con-

tained in, Report on the First United Nations Congress on the Preventionof Crime and the Treatment

of Offenders (U.N. Pub., No.: 1956.iv.4).
228 The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 10,
§ 3 G.A. Res. 2200 (xxi), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
229

The American Convention of Human Rights, art. 5, § 6 O.A.S. Treaty Series No.

36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/IH.23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1978).
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The matter of rehabilitation is incorporated into the bills of
rights of several state constitutions among their fundamental guarantees and safeguards. The Constitution of New Hampshire, in effect since 1784, establishes:
All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offence.
No wise legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes of
theft, forgery and the like, which they do those of murder and treason.
Where the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against all offences; the people are led to forget the real distinction in the crimes
themselves, and to commit the most flagrant with as little compunction
as they do those of the lightest dye. For the same reason a multitude
of sanguinary laws is both impolitic and unjust. The true design
of all
2 30
punishments being to reform, not to exterminate mankind.
With this emphatic conclusion the provision reinforces the utilitarian arguments used to support humane punishment. The provision not only denounces the injustice of sanguinary laws, but
invokes the reformative nature of criminal punishment. It thus links
the sentencing goals with a concept of reform inspired in a philanthropic, religious and humanitarian tradition. In the late eighteenth
century, the idea of rehabilitation represented a barrier against the
fearsome arbitrariness of the pre-Enlightenment exemplary punishment. Beccaria's humanistic and rational considerations on the legislative meting out of punishment were extended by the
Constitution of New Hampshire to the correctional field. But reform also had an evangelical content, going beyond utilitarian calculation. In 1850, Thorton, a delegate to Indiana's Constitutional
Convention, based his attack on the death penalty on precepts of the
Gospel and affirmed that "[t]he sole object of criminal punishment,
after securing society, is to reform, not to exterminate the
23
offender." '
In the nineteenth century, the requirement of rehabilitation was
included in the constitutions of Oregon, Indiana, Wyoming, and
Montana. According to Elbert F. Allen, these were simple embodiments of common law principles. 23 2 The Oregon Constitution goes
far beyond the eighth amendment's prohibitions, providing that
punishment be based on "principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice." 23 3 The same language is used by the Constitution
of Indiana providing that "the penal code shall be founded on the
230

N.H.

231
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CONST. art.

18.

1382 (1850).
Allen, Sources of the Montana State Constitution, MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL
1971-1972 (Research Memorandum 4) 2 (1972).
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principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice." 23 4 Likewise, the Constitution of Wyoming commands that "[t]he penal
code shall be framed on the human principles of reformation and
prevention." 23 5 The expression "vindictive justice," originally included in the draft, was struck during debate as superfluous. 23 6
Delegate Hoyt explained that the proposed section provided an "in23 7
dication toward humane methods."
The same question arose in Montana's 1889 Constitution. The
draft of its section 23 orginally read: "Laws for punishment of
crime shall be founded on the principle of reformation and prevention, and not of vindictive justice." 23 8 David M. Durfee moved to
strike the section, contending that it did not mean anything. 23 9 Hiram Knowles eloquently underlined the significance of the provision. 240 He said that it meant to substitute the view of making the
offender a "better man" for the "preposterous proposition" of punishing him in a spirit of revenge and that the section showed that the
country belonged "to the advanced age in regard to the matter." 2 4 1
Durfee insisted on striking the provision he considered to be superfluous. Walther M. Bickford defended Knowles' contention, emphasizing that punishment should not be inflicted in a vindictive spirit,
"but in a spirit of prevention, and for the purpose of preventing the
recurrence of the same crime, and that, as a civilized nation, we had
some respect and something in common with the rest of the
world." 24 2 The provision was finally adopted with the following
words: "Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the
principles of reformation and prevention, but this shall not affect
the power of the legislative assembly to provide for punishing of'243
fenses by death.
Modem provisions can be found in the 1972 Montana Constitution and in the constitutions of Alaska and Illinois. Under the heading "Rights of the Convicted," the Constitution of Montana
provides that "laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on
the principles of prevention and reformation. Full rights are re234 IND. CONST. § 18.
235 WYO. CONST. art. I, § 15.
236 JOURNAL AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF WYO-

719-20 (1893).
237 Id. at 719.

MING

238 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MONTANA

25 (1921).
239
240
241
242
243

Id. at 125.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 126.
MONT. CONST. art. III, § 24 (1889).

124-
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stored by the termination of state supervision for any offense against
the state." 2 44 The Constitution of Alaska adds to the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition the following command: "Penal administration shall be based on the principle of reformation and
upon the need to protect the public." 24 5 The Illinois Constitution
establishes that "all penalties shall be determined both according to
the seriousness of the offense and with the objective to restore the
24 6
offender to useful citizenship."
Especially when included in the bill of rights, such provisions
are highly significant. They shape penal legislation and are a source
of individual guarantees equivalent to the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. Occasionally, other clauses can be found
prescribing humane or healthy conditions of imprisonment. For instance, the Delaware Constitution includes an appendix to the prohibition against cruel punishments, determining that "in the
construction ofjails a proper regard shall be had to the health of the
prisoners." 24 7 Similarly, the Constitution of Tennessee commands
that "the erection of safe and comfortable prisons, the inspection of
prisons and the humane treatment of prisoners, shall be provided
for." 24 8 The same language governing the physical conditions of
prisons and the treatment of offenders was placed in the Constitution of Wyoming. 24 9 Other rights granted by state constitutions impose a pattern or style on eventual rehabilitative undertakings.
2 51
These are the right to privacy 250 and the right of conscience,
which exclude from treatment any form of brainwashing or ideological imposition. According to such rights, rehabilitative action
should respect the privacy of individuals and not curtail, but rather
intensify, their capacity for self-determination.
XII.

NON-CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF A
RIGHT TO REHABILITATION

The state's duty to try to rehabilitate convicted prisoners can
emerge from a statute or contract or from a situation that endangers
the mental or social integrity of the prisoner through particularly
grievous forms of imprisonment. The corresponding right of the
244 MONT. CONST. art. III,
245 ALAsKA CONST. § 12.

246 ILL. CONST. art.

§

24.

I, § 11.

247 DEL. CONST. § 11.
248 TENN. CONST. §

32.

249 WYO. CONST. art.

16.

250 E.g., ALAsKA CONST. § 22.
251 E.g., CAL. CONST. § 4; GA. CONST.

XVIII; N.H. CONsT. art. 4.
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inmate can be enforced through administrative litigation or tort
claims against prison authorities.
In some states an enforceable right to rehabilitation could be
derived from general statements of the purposes of the correctional
system or general directives to the correctional system as how to
treat the inmates (e.g., Massachusetts, 2 52 South Carolina,2 53 Rhode
Island, 254 New Jersey,2 5 5 New York,2 56 Washington,2 5 7 or Montana 2 58 )

259

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act 2 60 estab-

lishes a right of prisoners to uninterrupted and unimpeded
26
rehabilitation. '
Another possible source of a rehabilitative obligation on the
part of the state is parole contracts, in which the inmate and parole
authority agree upon a release date on the condition that the inmate
completes certain obligations including rehabilitation programs.
Cullen and Gilbert point out that the very existence of a contract
system puts pressure on correctional officers to improve treatment
services,2 62 and they advocate mandatory contracts obligating the
state to rehabilitate.2 6 "Mutual agreement programs" have proliferated in state prison and parole systems and are also being applied
in probation programs.2 64 These comprise a variety of negotiations
in which correctional authorities commit themselves to provide the
rehabilitative resources that allow inmates to fullfil the conditions of
2 65
their release.
A third source of the duty to rehabilitate springs from the very
fact that the state imprisons individuals. Imprisonment in America
today is an intrinsically dangerous situation. It demands from the
state a positive action to avert potential harm to prisoners' mental,
252 MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 24, § l(e)-(f) (Law. Co-op.
253 S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-1-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
254 R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-56-31 (1984).

1981).

255 NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:IB-6, 30:4-91.1, -91.3, -91.6, -92 (West 1981).
256

N.Y.

CORRECT.

LAw ch. 43, 1136 (McKinney 1968).

257 WASH. REv. CODE
258 MONT. CODE ANN.

§§ 72.08.101, 72.64.010, 72.01.150, 72.62.010 (1982).
§ 53-1-201 (1985).

259 On the process through which rehabilitative services have gradually come to be
seen as rights rather than privileges, see R. HARDY &J. CULL, INTRODUCTION TO CORRECTIONAL REHABILITATION 21 (1923).
260 18 U.S.C.
2 (1982).
261 See Gray v. Benson, 458 F. Supp. 1209 (D.
262 F. CULLEN & K. GILBERT, supra note 16, at

Kan. 1978).
271.

263 Id. at 273.
264 Glaser,Protocolfor MutualAgreement Programsin ParoleRelease,
AND COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 269 (1984).

in PROBATION,

PAROLE

265 Research on the effectiveness of parole contracts has not yet provided conclusive
results. See H. ALLEN, C. ESKRIDGE, E. LATESSA & G. VITO, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN

AMERICA

255 (1985).
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social and physical health. In some cases imprisonment amounts to
placing inmates in closed environments where they are exposed to
unlawful trade in and use of hard narcotics. 266 In others the harm
may be a permanent deterioration of the personality or a dramatic
loss in social capacity and skills. In all cases imprisonment creates a
situation of need that the prisoners alone, deprived of their liberty
by state action, cannot handle. In creating a dangerous situation,
the state has assumed not only a duty of care but an obligation to
prevent specific harms connected with such situations. An atmosphere of imminent danger to physical well-being and of acute reversion of human development not only infringes upon constitutional
provisions but creates, whenever an identifiable harm can be determined, the possibility of civil and even criminal liabilities.
In this context, it is useful to apply the general category of derivative liability developed by Fletcher in comparative criminal
law. 26 7 Unlike the "direct" liability of the standard cases of perpetration, derivative liability arises either from a failure to prevent a
harm that the law seeks to prevent or from forms of behavior accessorial to criminal acts committed by others. 2 68 Fletcher distinguishes derivative liability for failure to avert harm both from direct
liability for breach of a universal statutory command and from the
breach of a general duty of care in cases of negligent causation of
harm. 2 69 This distinction between negligence and intentional derivative liability is all the more important in view of the restrictive interpretation of recent Supreme Court decisions on governmental
2 70
responsibility for civil rights violations.
Permitting harm to occur is a source of liability only when there
is a personal duty to render assistance. 27 ' Futhermore, the context
of the relationship between the actor and the person in jeopardy,
and the particular circumstances of the case need to be considered
in determining, whether "the failure to avert harm is as egregious a
wrong as causing the particular harm." 2 72 Inaction may be liable
omission if the previous action of the actor created the danger to the
potential victim. Persons that knowingly create the need for aid
have a duty to prevent harm. Under certain circumstances inaction
266 Bresolin v. Morris, 88 Wash. 2d 167, 175-76, 558 P.2d 1350, 1354 (1977)(UtterJ.,
dissenting).
267 G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 581-682 (1978).
268 Id. at 583.
269 Id. at 586.

See Whitley v. Albers, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1084 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct.
662, 667 n.3. (1986).
271 G. FLETCHER, supra note 267, at 604.
272 Id. at 605.
270
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renders person with the knowledge as liable as if they had caused
the results by committing an intentional deed. This liability can
only be avoided by a positive action neutralizing the dangerous situation created. Following this line of reasoning, the state would be
liable for all harmful effects of incarceration exceeding the lawful
scope of deprivation of liberty unless it took clear action directed
towards counteracting those effects. Such actions should consist
largely of rehabilitative undertakings.
XIII.

CONCLUSION

To subject inmates to the harmful effects of imprisonment without allowing them any possibility of counteracting these harms is
additional and unlawful punishment. Without opportunities for rehabilitation at the educational, labor or therapeutic levels, the warehoused offender inevitably deteriorates. Because penal servitude
and hard labor have been abolished, imprisonment in a modem civilized society consists only of the deprivation of liberty. To administer such legal punishment without unwarranted side-effects requires
rehabilitative action. This effort cannot be reduced to a discrete set
of programs, but should create a rehabilitative environment through
the reorganization of the correctional institution and its linkage, so
far as possibile, with the community through various forms of furloughs and pre-release programs. Efforts to avoid the pernicious
effects of incarceration find their ultimate expression in the creation
of noncustodial alternatives to incarceration. The most promising
field for rehabilitative undertakings lies in the community.
Modem rehabilitative policies represent a challenge to the fantasy that the dark side of society can be forgotten and that its deviants can be simply packed off to prisons. But rehabilitative action
should not remain merely a goal of governmental policies, however
enlightened and humanistic. Rehabilitation will be fully realized
only when it is recognized as a right of the offender, independent of
utilitarian considerations and of transient penal strategies. Viewed
as the culmination of a continuum of offenders' rights, rehabilitation
can no longer serve as a pretext for discretionary abuse on the part
of sentencing and correctional authorities. To the contrary, a right
to rehabilitation reinforces the legal status of the sentenced offender
and requires sentencing and correctional policies compatible with
rehabilitative prison conditions. Because of its deep connection
with the essence of criminal punishment, the right to rehabilitation
has a paramount constitutional significance. Thus, a constitutional
right to rehabilitation has been included in the bill of rights of vari-
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ous countries and is one of the basic principles of customary international law.
While denying the existence of a constitutional federal right to
rehabilitation, American courts have acknowledged it in a negative
way as the right to counteract the deteriorating effects of imprisonment. The courts have also granted the prisoner a limited right to
psychiatric and psychological treatment. Arguments based on the
eighth and fourteenth amendments, as well as the application of
customary international law, reveal the existence of an implicit right
to rehabilitation in the United States Constitution. Full recognition
of this rehabilitative mandate, reinforcing existing provisions in
state constitutions and in statutory law, would earn the United
States a place in the penological vanguard of nations that have decided to combat crime at the highest civilized level.

